We study the role of an imbalance in …ghting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of con ‡ict. Our experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of con ‡ict is independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of con ‡ict is higher if power is more imbalanced. Even though endogenous bargaining outcomes re ‡ect the players' unequal …ghting strengths, strategic uncertainty causes outcomes to be most e¢ cient when power is balanced. In turn, the importance of exogenous mediation proposals depends on the balance of power.
Introduction
The reasons for international military con ‡ict and the question of how to prevent it have intrigued researchers from di¤erent social science disciplines. Countries can often earn a large peace dividend if they settle their con ‡ict peacefully and …nd a means to share this peace dividend. Nevertheless, countries also frequently engage in war as an outcome of international con ‡ict. Based on an experimental laboratory framework, this paper addresses the impact of power asymmetry on the likelihood and nature of peaceful settlements.
A considerable number of theories have been put forward to explain the occurrence of war, and the discussion is ongoing (see, e.g., Wagner 1994 , Fearon 1995 , Powell 1996 , 1999 , Wagner 2000 , Chadefaux 2011 , Benson et al. 2014 ; for surveys see Kydd 2010 and Jackson and Morelli 2011). Early theories suggest that the balance of military power is important. One school of thought (power transition theory) argues that military con ‡ict is most likely whenever exogenous changes in power lead adversaries to be of roughly similar strength. 1 Another school of thought (balance of power theory) predicts that military con ‡ict is most likely to break out if the con ‡icting nations have very di¤erent military power. Balance of power theorists (Morgenthau 1948 , Kaplan 1957 , Claude 1962 , Wright 1965 , Ferris 1973 argue that parity dissuades nations from …ghting because parity is associated with high uncertainty regarding the war outcome. With equal power both countries are reluctant to …ght unless both believe they have a good chance of winning, and a certain amount of military dominance is necessary for a successful attack of a weaker nation. Therefore, this theory predicts con ‡ict with larger power imbalances and predicts peace when power is balanced.
Challenging these views, Wittman (1979) suggests that the balance of power should not matter for the probability of military con ‡ict; it should only matter for the distribution of the resources. The intuition behind this argument is that players who di¤er in their military capacity take this asymmetry into account when negotiating about the peace dividend. If there is an imbalance of power and one side is more likely to win at war, this side's peaceful demands increase, but at the same time the other side's peaceful demands decrease. A settlement must make both countries better o¤ than they are in case of war, but a settlement should be feasible with a small or a large imbalance of power, because the imbalance can be accounted for in the bargaining shares in the peaceful negotiation outcome.
Analyzing the relation between the balance of power and the likelihood of con ‡ict with 1 This power transition theory, also called power shift theory (Gulick 1955 , Organski 1958 , Garnham 1976 , Waltz 1979 , Organski and Kugler 1980 , Levy 1987 , Blainey 1988 , Kim and Morrow 1992 ; a survey is Tammen 2008), takes a dynamic approach. War will be initiated either by a weaker but rising challenger or by a country with superior but declining power. During periods of power preponderance (imbalance of power), the likelihood of wars decreases. real world data is di¢ cult since each potential con ‡ict is full of idiosyncratic elements. Sample selection and endogeneity issues pose a major di¢ culty to empirical work (see, e.g., Houweling and Siccama 1988 , Powell 2002 , Wohlforth et al. 2007 , Wallensteen and Svensson 2014) . Our laboratory experiment evidently sidesteps a number of highly relevant issues. However, it can address many of the problems arising in this empirical work and clearly isolate the importance of the balance of power for the propensity of resource wasteful con ‡ict.
Building on Wittman's argument on the balance of power, we analyze how asymmetries in …ghting strengths a¤ect the probability of entering into resource wasteful con ‡ict and the distribution of the peace dividend if the players reach a peaceful solution. We consider two alternative institutional arrangements in which bargaining takes place; both arrangements make a peaceful sharing outcome the clearly more attractive option. In one arrangement, the two players endogenously decide on the shares of the peace dividend which each of them demands. This arrangement may be interpreted as a direct confrontation of the players at the negotiation table. In the other arrangement, peaceful sharing follows an exogenously proposed division of the resources, which players may accept or reject. This arrangement can be interpreted as bargaining with a mediator. The mediator suggests an equitable peaceful division outcome, thereby structuring the negotiations according to clear and simple rules, and removing elements of strategic uncertainty. 2 As further robustness check, we also analyze an intermediate arrangement with a 'weaker'mediator who suggests a peaceful division but in which the two players still endogenously decide on the share they demand.
The next section provides an overview of the experimental setup and the main results, and it relates our study to the literature. Then, we describe the formal details of the theoretical and experimental framework (Section 3), derive the main hypotheses (Section 4), and present the results of the experiment (Section 5).
The research context
In the experimental setup, players …rst bargain over the division of a given amount of resources (the prize). If they fail to reach an agreement, they enter into a resource wasteful con ‡ict, modeled as a Tullock (1980) lottery contest. The key feature of our experimental design is the variation of the players' relative …ghting strengths in the contest, which are known when bargaining. This variation enables us to identify whether an increased imbalance of power is re ‡ected in the bargaining outcome and how the imbalance of power a¤ects the probability that players fail to reach a peaceful outcome at the bargaining stage.
We approach this question by analyzing two variants of the bargaining game. The bargaining variants isolate di¤erent e¤ects that may be important for reaching a peaceful agreement. As the baseline treatment, players are (exogenously) o¤ered a division of the prize, which they can either accept or reject. The exogenous division mechanism is a shortcut for a mechanism that implements the Nash bargaining solution, taking as threat points the players' con ‡ict payo¤s (which depend on their relative …ghting strengths). We may also think of an impartial mediator who enters into the picture and makes this division proposal as a formative (procedural) mediation e¤ort. We compare this benchmark game to a Nash demand game. In the Nash demand game, both players simultaneously choose a demand, and con ‡ict occurs if and only if the endogenous demands sum up to more than the prize value. 3 Hence, the Nash demand game introduces strategic uncertainty and coordination problems, which are absent by construction in the baseline treatment. Varying the bargaining mechanism allows us to check for an interaction e¤ect, that is, we analyze whether an imbalance of power has di¤erential e¤ects under di¤erent degrees of complexity of the bargaining mechanism. Moreover, we conduct two types of control treatments: one in which we change the exogenously given division to an equal split; and one in which we suggest a possible division in the Nash demand game which corresponds to the allocation under the exogenous division mechanism but is fully non-binding. In all treatments, we observe a signi…cant probability of resource wasteful con ‡ict. A larger imbalance of power does not in ‡uence the likelihood of con ‡ict in case of the exogenous division mechanism. In case of an exogenous division, the disadvantaged player consistently rejects the proposed division more often than the advantaged player. However, in case of endogenous demands the likelihood of con ‡ict signi…cantly increases with a larger imbalance of power. With large power asymmetry, the players' total demands chosen are too high and the 50-50 split is not predominant; con ‡ict arises in more than half of the cases. If a peaceful agreement is reached, however, the player with the low …ghting ability earns almost the entire surplus. With small power asymmetry, players successfully implement an endogenous peaceful 50-50 split in about half of the cases. Here, the con ‡ict probability is lower and total payo¤s are higher than under the exogenous division. In other words, if power is balanced, exogenous mediation proposals even lead to more con ‡ict than own demand choices in the negotiations.
Our paper is related to the large literature on international politics, in particular on rationalist theories of bargaining and con ‡ict. This literature has already been referenced brie ‡y above. Experimental work in this literature addresses several aspects of bargaining in the shadow of con ‡ict. McBride and Skaperdas (2014) deal with the likelihood of con ‡ict when players are symmetric, concentrating on di¤erences in the imposed discount factors of the future. Ke et al. (forthcoming) consider acceptance of an exogenously imposed sharing rule within victorious alliances. consider con ‡ict avoidance through the choice of a lottery, focusing on the degree of commitment to the lottery outcome. Sheremeta (2013, 2014) analyze the likelihood of con ‡ict when one player can o¤er a side-payment to his co-player. They …nd that side payments are used to avoid con ‡ict and that larger side payments decrease the probability of con ‡ict. Lacomba et al. (2014) focus on choices between production and investments in arms when con ‡ict arises exogenously but post-con ‡ict appropriation is endogenous. In Smith et al. (2014) , symmetric players can invest in arms before deciding whether to cooperate. The emergence of con ‡ict with heterogenous players is also analyzed by . In their experiment, subjects choose between a peaceful symmetric lottery and a contest. As peaceful sharing rules themselves are always exogenously given, a mismatch of sharing rules and …ghting strength may occur, and …ghting may be induced because one of the key mechanisms to prevent …ghting is blocked. Our experiment accounts for Wittman's (1979) argument and isolates the e¤ect of an increased imbalance of power on peaceful sharing and con ‡ict avoidance, comparing di¤erent bargaining mechanisms. Our paper is also related to the literature on bargaining experiments. The institutional design of bargaining becomes relevant in experimental work by Schneider and Krämer (2004) who consider di¤erent fair-division procedures, documenting the importance of rules and their credibility. Eisenkopf and Bächtiger (2013) consider the role of an impartial or biased mediator who may facilitate communication and/or may be able to punish con ‡ict parties. Their frameworks hint at the role of norms and rules. Our results also underline the importance of institutional rules for negotiation failure. However, in their frameworks negotiation failure does not lead to wasteful con ‡ict and to …ghting for a prize in a contest. Two papers that consider asymmetries between players in a bargaining context are Feltovich (2013, 2014) , varying the exogenously given disagreement payo¤s for players (in a Nash demand game and an unstructured bargaining game). They …nd that players are less sensitive to changes in their bargaining position than theory predicts, as the players closely stick to the 50-50 split. Sieberg et al. (2013) study the e¤ect of power asymmetries in a two-stage alternating o¤er game with shrinking pie; if no agreement is reached, a lottery with exogenous win probabilities determines the allocation. They …nd no clear relationship between the probability of early agreement and power asymmetry.
There is also a growing literature on contest experiments with asymmetric players, in particular asymmetric Tullock lottery contests; for a recent survey on contest experiments see Dechenaux et al. (2014) . There is mixed evidence on the e¤ect of asymmetry on rent dissipation in the contest. For instance, Davis and Reilly (1998) …nd that rent dissipation decreases with asymmetry, but not as much as theory predicts. 4 On the other hand, in Hörtnagl et al. (2013) , heterogeneity even increases e¤ort expenditures, and Anderson and Sta¤ord (2003) …nd no e¤ect of cost heterogeneity on rent dissipation. As a side result of our experiment, rent dissipation in the con ‡ict is reduced if the imbalance of power increases, in line with the theory prediction.
3 Theoretical and experimental framework
Formal framework and equilibrium prediction
We consider two players A and B who compete in a two-stage game about a prize that has monetary value V . Nature endows them with di¤erent …ghting abilities which are common knowledge and are denoted c A 0 and c B 0. These abilities will become important in stage 2.
In stage 1, A and B bargain about the division of the prize. We consider two variants of this stage which characterize two di¤erent games. (i) The …rst type of game is called the Split game and described by shares s A and s B that are exogenously given. Players can accept or reject a division of V according to these shares. If both players accept, they divide the prize accordingly and the game ends. If A or B or both of them reject, they enter into stage 2. (ii) The second type of game is called the Demand game: The two players A and B simultaneously choose a share of the prize, which is then announced. If both shares sum up to not more than the value of the prize V , each player receives the share of the prize demanded and the game ends. If the shares sum up to more than V , then A and B fail to reach an agreement, and they enter into stage 2 of the game.
Stage 2 is the same for both variants of the bargaining stage. In stage 2, the players have to …ght about the prize in a Tullock (1980) 
Here, p i denotes player i's probability of winning the prize and is equal to
if x A + x B > 0 and equal to 1=2 otherwise. Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium of the stage 2 subgame is well known (Szidarowszky and Okuguchi 1997, Cornes and Hartley 2007). Table 1 characterizes the equilibrium. It has intuitively plausible properties. Equilibrium e¤ort x i is decreasing in a player's e¤ort cost c i , but equilibrium cost of e¤ort c i x i is the same for both players. Hence, the player with the lower cost of e¤ort (Player A) wins with higher probability and has a higher expected payo¤. We now turn to the details of the two di¤erent setups for stage 1.
The bargaining game (stage 1): exogenous division mechanism. In the Split game, a division (s A ; s B ) of the prize is exogenously proposed with s A being the solution to
Bg, is the expected equilibrium payo¤ of the stage 2 contest subgame (as given in Table 1 ). The solution to (1) yields
Note that these values are exogenous from the perspective of the players, and that their choice set is only about accepting or not accepting these values. Solution (2) splits the surplus from agreement evenly between the two players. 6 The choice of this division rule has intuitive appeal, not only because it is the solution to (1). 7 For the experimental setup, we use s A and s B as the values that emerged from cooperative Nash bargaining assuming equal bargaining power and using the equilibrium payo¤s of the contest as threat points. Players A and B learn these values and simultaneously decide whether to accept or to reject the division (s A ; s B ). If both accept, A gets a payo¤ of s A and B gets a payo¤ of s B , and the game ends. If at least one player rejects the proposed division, the game enters into the …ghting subgame in stage 2.
In the subgame perfect equilibrium, player i 2 fA; Bg anticipates the own expected equilibrium payo¤ i in the stage 2 contest subgame. Player i prefers acceptance of the division if and only if s i i . Note that s i = p i V > i : If players maximize their expected material payo¤, both players will choose to accept the peaceful split in equilibrium. In the Demand game, there is a continuum of stage 1 choices (s A ; s B ) that belong to a subgame perfect equilibrium. The set of pairs (s A ; s B ) that characterizes the set of e¢ cient pure-strategy equilibrium choices is characterized by s A A , s B B and s A + s B = V . There is also a continuum of ine¢ cient equilibria, which are generally characterized by 6 A symmetry assumption regarding the split rule corresponds to the symmetry assumption in the Nash demand game in the respective treatment and, hence, allows us to compare exogenous and endogenous division mechanisms. Moreover, since both players are equally pivotal in whether a division is accepted, this should provide them with the same bargaining power when dividing the aggregate surplus. While players may further be assumed to di¤er in their bargaining power, bargaining power should not be identi…ed with …ghting power, which is already re ‡ected in the threat points and, thus, in the division (s A ; s B ). 7 This rule maximizes the minimum of the two players' gains from cooperation at stage 1. Since both players need to agree to the proposal, this maximin property makes this rule an attractive choice for a mediator who would like to make a proposal that is likely to be accepted. In addition, this rule emerges as subgame perfect equilibrium of a non-cooperative bargaining game with alternating o¤ers and an exogenous probability of termination of the negotiations if this probability becomes very small such that the advantage of making the …rst o¤er vanishes. 8 Strictly speaking, this is the payo¤ dominant equlibrium. Another equilibrium exists in which both players reject because none of them is pivotal if the other player rejects. This other equilibrium does not survive trembling. In the experimental setup, we allow for minor trembling to eliminate this equilibrium. More precisely, if one player rejects the division and the other chooses to accept, there is a 10% probability that the proposed division is implemented in order to ensure that, in the experiment, a player's choice reveals his preference even when he expects his co-player to reject the division. 72 subjects 9 independent obs. 72 subjects 9 independent obs. Note: Split: exogenously proposed shares (Nash bargaining solution); Demand: Nash demand game. Table 2 : Experimental treatments: 2 2 between subjects design. V s A < B and V s B < A : Suppose that player A asks for an excessively high share which does not leave su¢ cient resources on the bargaining table to make B at least as well-o¤ as in the …ghting equilibrium. Then, B will prefer to …ght. As B's choice of s B is arbitrary and inconsequential, B may actually choose a very high demand as well. In this case, unilateral deviations to a lower demand s i (with s i i ) cannot avoid con ‡ict.
Experimental treatments and procedures
Treatments. The experiment is based on a 2 2 between subjects design. The …rst dimension varies the bargaining mechanism in stage 1 (exogenously proposed Split versus Nash Demand), and the second dimension focuses on the degree of asymmetry in …ghting strengths (Small versus Large asymmetry). 9 In the treatments with small asymmetry, the players'e¤ort cost in the contest in stage 2 are set to c A = 4 and c B = 5, respectively; thus, players are "almost symmetric" in the contest stage. 10 In the treatments with large asymmetry, we increase the cost spread to c A = 2 and c B = 7, keeping the average cost parameter and average e¤ort constant. In all treatments, the prize value is equal to V = 549. Table 2 summarizes the treatments. For the exogenous division mechanism (Split), the choice of the cost parameters implies that the exogenous peaceful split option is (5V =9; 4V =9) = (305; 244) in case of small asymmetry and (7V =9; 2V =9) = (427; 122) for large asymmetry. Table A.1 in the appendix summarizes the parameters used in the experiment together with the theory prediction (in Demand, possible choices in e¢ cient equilibria). Note that, for a given cost asymmetry in Split, the sacri…ce in payo¤s when choosing con ‡ict is the same for players A and B (that is, s A A = s B B ). Due to the higher e¤ort cost with small asymmetry, however, this sacri…ce in payo¤s is higher in Small than in Large, following the standard theory result that rent dissipation is highest if the contestants are equally strong.
Procedures. The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007 ) and run at the MELESSA laboratory in Munich, Germany. Subjects were recruited from the student body of Munich universities using ORSEE (Greiner 2004 ). We admitted 24 subjects to each session. Each subject participated in exactly one of the treatments outlined above. The game described in Section 3.1 was played repeatedly (30 independent interactions/rounds in total), but the subjects were randomly rematched in each round. To obtain a larger number of independent observations, random matching took place in subgroups, each consisting of 8 participants. No speci…c information was provided to the subjects about the precise nature of matching other than that they would be randomly re-matched between rounds. The total number of participants was 288 (72 subjects in 9 matching groups per treatment).
At the beginning of each session, written instructions were distributed and read out loud (see Appendix B for a sample of the instructions). Subjects had to complete a quiz to make sure they understand the experiment. In the main part of the experiment, the role as player A or B (the respective cost parameter) was randomly assigned to the players in each of the 30 rounds and announced at the beginning of a round. 11 In Split, the division proposal (s A ; s B ) was shown to the participants. No speci…c information was provided about how this proposal was generated. Players decided whether to accept the division of the prize. In Demand, the participants had to enter their demand as an integer between 0 and 549.
teristics and behavior in the main part of the experiment, including incentivized tests on distributional preferences (subjects had to repeatedly make two-person allocation decisions, following Bartling et al. 2009 and Balafoutas et al. 2012 ) and preferences for playing a lottery. The lottery was similar to the …ghting subgame, but subjects had to decide whether to invest a …xed amount at a given win probability which increased from 0:1 to 0:9 in increments of 0:2. Moreover, the questionnaire contained several questions on the willingness to take risks (Dohmen et al. 2011 ) and one task to elicit ambiguity aversion. At the end of the experiment subjects were paid separately and in private. In all treatments, the conversion rate was 50 points = 1 euro. Each participant received a show up fee of 4 euros, 10 euros to cover e¤ort cost expenses, the earnings (possibly negative) of 3 randomly selected rounds from the main experiment plus the payo¤ (also possibly negative) from one randomly selected post-experimental task. On average, subjects earned 26 euros (plus the show-up fee), and a session took about 100 minutes.
Hypotheses
Small versus large asymmetry. The treatments with the exogenous division mechanism in the bargaining stage (Split) serve as a baseline for measuring the e¤ect of an imbalance of power. This treatment abstracts from strategic uncertainty and coordination problems in stage 1: players either agree to an exogenous split or not. Hence, this treatment isolates the e¤ect of an increased asymmetry in …ghting ability. In line with Wittman's (1979) claim, focusing on rational players who maximize material payo¤, the balance or imbalance of power should not matter for the likelihood of con ‡ict since the imbalance of power translates into the bargaining shares that players obtain (re ‡ected in the exogenously proposed division). Balance of power theory, in contrast, suggests that larger power imbalances lead to more con ‡ict since larger asymmetry increases the advantaged player's win probability and his con ‡ict payo¤, making it more attractive to incite war. 13 The two approaches lead to two competing hypotheses: 14 Hypothesis 1a (Wittman) : The likelihood of con ‡ict is independent of whether players are almost symmetric ( Small) or asymmetric ( Large) in terms of …ghting strengths.
Hypothesis 1b (Balance of power): The likelihood of con ‡ict is lower when players are almost symmetric ( Small) than when they are asymmetric ( Large) in terms of …ghting strengths.
Exogenous division versus Nash demand game. Compared to the option to split according to exogenous shares (Split), players face strategic uncertainty and the possibility of coordination failure in the demand game (Demand); we expect that these problems make con ‡ict more likely. In the Nash demand game, players may not be able to coordinate on one of the equilibria. The sum of their demands may exceed the prize: they ask for "too much," causing bargaining to break down. Similarly, there are ine¢ cient equilibria that lead to con ‡ict. Overall, we expect players to more frequently arrive at the con ‡ict stage in Demand compared to Split, both for small and for large asymmetry in the …ghting strengths.
Hypothesis 2 (Bargaining mechanism):
The likelihood of con ‡ict is lower for the exogenous division mechanism ( Split) than when players endogenously choose their demands ( Demand).
In the Demand treatments, the larger the asymmetry, the more likely coordination failure might be to occur. Table A .1 shows that the 50-50 split of the prize is not an equilibrium in case of large asymmetry (A should rationally demand at least A = 333 > 549=2). Therefore, within the Demand treatments, we expect coordination to be easier and, hence, con ‡ict to be less likely under Small than under Large asymmetry, in line with Hypothesis 1b.
In addition to the main hypotheses on the overall likelihood of con ‡ict, we can also derive predictions for individual decisions in both stages of the experiment.
On the choice whether to reject in the SPLIT treatments: Players may care not only for their monetary rewards, but also for status, that is, their material payo¤ relative to that of others. 15 If the players accept the exogenous division, player B is disadvantaged and ends up with a lower payo¤ than player A. If B chooses to …ght, then both players sacri…ce some income, but B has a chance to end up with a higher payo¤ than A. The choice of …ghting can be preferable for B if he is su¢ ciently strongly motivated by relative standing concerns. 16 This is most evident for the case of ordinal relative standing preferences. The disadvantaged player B can reverse the payo¤ ranking only by entering into the contest. 17 Accordingly, relative standing considerations suggest that the disadvantaged player B may have a stronger incentive to reject the proposed split than the advantaged player A.
On sharing in the DEMAND treatments: The payo¤ in the contest is the outside option of players in the Nash demand game. High relative …ghting strength yields a high outside option. In turn, a high outside option suggests a higher demand. This relationship is not a sharp equilibrium prediction, as there is multiplicity of equilibrium in the demand game (recall Table A .1). The prediction becomes sharp if we assume, in addition, symmetry, or if we restrict consideration to risk dominant equilibria (a frequent restriction in the analysis of Nash demand games; see also Feltovich 2013, 2014) . We therefore expect that a player's demand is positively correlated with the relative …ghting strength. In other words, we expect the advantaged player A to choose a higher demand than the disadvantaged player B and this di¤erence to be higher with large than with small cost asymmetry.
On …ghting e¤orts in the Tullock contest: In line with the theory prediction on the Tullock (1980) contest for players who are motivated by monetary rewards, we expect the following: E¤ort cost (rent dissipation) should be decreasing in the degree of asymmetry. Thus, e¤ort cost should be lower in Large than in Small, independent of the bargaining mechanism. This may contribute to a higher likelihood of con ‡ict in Large compared to Small since bargaining failure is predicted to be less costly in Large; the treatment comparisons along the two dimensions will shed light on the role of such e¢ ciency considerations. Finally, on the individual level we expect e¤ort to be higher for the advantaged than for the disadvantaged players.
Results
Our main research question is on the relationship between power balance and con ‡ict probability. We …rst consider the probability of con ‡ict and overall e¢ ciency. Then we discuss our result by analyzing individual choices at the con ‡ict and the bargaining stage. The analysis in Sections 5.1 -5.4 is mainly based on non-parametric tests; Section A.2 presents a regression analysis of individual-level data. Note: Calculated are mean and standard error (in parentheses) of the probability that a game proceeds to the contest stage (panel a) and the total payo¤s of A and B (panel b). Values based on matching group averages (8 subjects over 30 rounds per matching group). Di¤erences are tested using Mann Whitney U tests on the matching-group level (18 observations per test), ***(*) signi…cant at the 1% (10%) level.
On the probability of con ‡ict
The left panel in Figure 1 shows the frequency of con ‡ict. Theory predicts that there should never be con ‡ict, focusing on the e¢ cient peaceful equilibrium outcomes in all four treatments. But there is a signi…cant amount of con ‡ict in all treatments. More importantly, consider the e¤ect of increased asymmetry in Figure 1a . For the case of an exogenous division (column Split), the probability of con ‡ict does not di¤er signi…cantly between the treatments with small asymmetry (33:6%) and with large asymmetry (35:9%). Thus, we cannot reject Wittman's (1979) hypothesis that the balance of power does not matter for the likelihood of con ‡ict. An imbalance of power per se (as in Large), without strategic uncertainty and coordination problems, does not lead to more con ‡ict (Hypothesis 1a).
In the Nash demand treatments, however, we see a di¤erent result: In the Demand column of Figure 1a , the probability of con ‡ict doubles in case of a large imbalance (53:2%) compared to the case of small asymmetry (26:9%), in line with Hypothesis 1b. This shows that the e¤ect of an increased imbalance of power depends on how di¢ cult it is to reach agreement in the bargaining stage.
Result 1 (a) In case of exogenous divisions, peaceful agreement does not fail more often with large asymmetry than with small asymmetry in …ghting strengths. (b) In case of endogenous demands, peaceful agreement fails more often with large asymmetry than with small asymmetry in …ghting strengths. Now turn to the e¤ect of endogenizing demands for a given cost asymmetry in Figure 1a . With a large imbalance of power (row Large), the probability of con ‡ict is signi…cantly higher when players have to choose their demands endogenously (53:2%) instead of deciding on a given division (35:9%), in line with the bargaining mechanism hypothesis (Hypothesis 2).
At the same time, for the case of small asymmetry (row Small), the probability of con ‡ict is lower when players can endogenously choose their demands (26:9%), compared to the case where they can accept or reject the exogenously given split (33:6%). Although there is strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand treatment, we observe less con ‡ict. This contradicts the bargaining mechanism hypothesis (the di¤erence of 6:8% is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero; p-value is 0:057). We will discuss this …nding below when analyzing individual stage 1 decisions.
Result 2 (a) With small asymmetry in …ghting strengths, peaceful agreement on endogenous demands fails less often than peaceful agreement on exogenous divisions. (b) With large asymmetry in …ghting strengths, peaceful agreement on endogenous demands fails more often than peaceful agreement on exogenous divisions.
In line with the e¤ect on the con ‡ict probability, Figure 1b shows that total payo¤s (and, hence, rent dissipation) are very similar in Split-Small, Split-Large, and DemandSmall. They are signi…cantly lower (and, hence, rent dissipation is signi…cantly higher) in the Nash demand game with large asymmetry. These lower payo¤s are a consequence of the high con ‡ict probability that is observed in this treatment.
In the remainder of this section, we consider in more detail the reasons for the observed relation between the balance of power and the emergence of con ‡ict. First, we analyze the e¤ort choices in the stage 2 con ‡ict and the resulting cost of con ‡ict. Then, we turn to the individual choices in stage 1 which form the basis of the observed con ‡ict probability.
Stage 2 decisions: on …ghting
Consider individual choices in the contest if the players cannot peacefully split the prize in stage 1. Figure 2 summarizes individual e¤ort levels in the stage 2 contest. 18 The data reveal that, with small cost asymmetry, e¤orts of A and B are very similar. When the asymmetry increases, however, the advantaged player increases his e¤ort while the disadvantaged player reduces his e¤ort. 19 Second, from Figure 2 , we can directly compute the e¤ort cost expended with small asymmetry (e¤ort cost parameters (c A ; c B ) = (4; 5) compared to a large asymmetry (e¤ort cost parameters (c A ; c B ) = (2; 7)). With the exogenous division in Split, total e¤ort cost (rent dissipation) with a small asymmetry is higher (318:1) than with a large asymmetry (281:5). Similarly, with endogenous demands in Demand, total e¤ort cost with a small asymmetry is higher (306:2) than with a large asymmetry (227:8). 20 The di¤erence in rent dissipated between Small and Large, although smaller than predicted, makes peaceful agreement more attractive (compared to the outside option of …ghting) in case of a balance of power than in case of largely asymmetric …ghting strengths.
Result 3 Total rent dissipation in the con ‡ict decreases in the degree of asymmetry, making bargaining failure more costly when players are similar in terms of their …ghting strength.
While Result 3 addresses the sum of e¤ort costs, we also see that the individual cost of entering stage 2 is larger in Small than in Large for both player A and player B (see the overview of the payo¤s from both stages in Appendix A.3).
procedure might also a¤ect non-monetary values of winning the contest or cause di¤erent selection e¤ects. Note, however, that player B's average con ‡ict payo¤ does not signi…cantly di¤er between the bargaining mechanisms. 20 The e¤ect of an increased asymmetry on total e¤ort cost is, however, only statistically signi…cant in Demand (p-value is 0:01). The weaker e¤ect in Split is mainly due to the disadvantaged player who strongly overdissipates with large asymmetry; also see the remark on the e¤ort levels above.
With endogenous demands, a peaceful outcome is more likely if the asymmetry in …ghting strengths of the two players is small (Result 1(b) ). This is in line with e¢ ciency considerations. The predicted overall cost of con ‡ict is higher if the players have more similar …ghting strengths, making it more valuable to reach a peaceful agreement if players are very similar in terms of …ghting strength (also compare Wittman 2009). E¢ ciency considerations would, however, also induce the con ‡ict probability in Split to be lower for small asymmetry than for large asymmetry, in contrast to Result 1(a). The following analysis of stage 1 choices will reveal that e¢ ciency considerations alone cannot explain the observed treatment di¤erences in the emergence of con ‡ict.
Stage 1 decisions

On the choice to reject in the SPLIT treatments
According to the theory predictions, both players A and B have a strictly dominant strategy to accept the exogenously given division of the prize. Nonetheless, there is a signi…cant probability of rejections in all treatments, as summarized in the left panel of Figure 3 . Moreover, the rejection probability is lowest for the strongly advantaged player in case of large asymmetry (8:6%) and highest for the strongly disadvantaged player in Large (32:9%), revealing a simple pattern: The less a player is o¤ered (the lower his relative …ghting strength), the more likely he rejects the o¤er. 21 This e¤ect is particularly strong when comparing the advantaged player A and the disadvantaged player B, both for small and for large asymmetry.
Result 4
The rejection probability is higher for the disadvantaged player than for the advantaged player.
The signi…cant di¤erence in rejection probabilities of players A and B suggests that e¢ ciency considerations (the cost of con ‡ict in stage 2; Result 3) cannot be the main explanation of observed con ‡ict probabilities in Small and Large. Rather, disadvantaged players seem to consider the proposed division inappropriate. 22 The result on the higher re- 21 Recall that, in Figure 3a , the exogenous share o¤ered to the players becomes lower when moving clockwise from A-Large to A-Small to B-Small to B-Large. 22 During the experiment a calculator was o¤ered on the screen as a help to compute win probabilities for possible e¤ort choices. If we use the values entered for the co-player's e¤ort as a proxy for the individual beliefs about the actual e¤ort of the co-player, we can deduce the individuals' expected win probabilities (although with the caveat that not all subjects made use of the calculator). In Small, the expected win probabilities of A and B are about 52-54%; thus players may perceive themselves as basically symmetric. In Large, player A's perceived win probability increases to 60% while B's perceived win probability decreases to 42% (both for Split and for Demand). Values are based on matching group averages (8 subjects over 30 rounds per matching group). Di¤erences between SMALL and LARGE are tested using Mann Whitney U tests and di¤erences between A and B are tested using Wilcoxon signed rank test; tests on the matching-group level (18 observations per test), ***(**) signi…cant at the 1% (5%) level. jection probability of disadvantaged players is in line with preferences on relative standing. 23 In Section 5.4 we will further discuss the rejection behavior in Split when presenting a control treatment which uses a di¤erent exogenous division (an equal split).
On sharing in the DEMAND treatments
The right panel of Figure 3 summarizes the player's choices in stage 1 of the Nash demand game. We …nd: The lower a player's relative …ghting strength, the lower is the player's demand. This e¤ect emerges and is statistically signi…cant both for the di¤erence between small and large asymmetry for a given type of player (A or B) and the di¤erence between advantaged and disadvantaged player for a given asymmetry (Small or Large).
Result 5 A player's demand is increasing in his relative …ghting strength.
Comparing the endogenous demands to the exogenous division in the Split treatment, we …nd that the advantaged player A demands less whereas the disadvantaged player B demands more than what would be attributed by the division in Split. Overall, both in Small and in Large, the two players'average demands sum up to more than 100%, but are very close to 100% of the prize value in case of small asymmetry (for the distribution of individual demand choices see the …gures in Appendix A.4). Moreover, with large asymmetry, both players'average demands clearly di¤er from the 50-50 split: In Large, players demand half of the prize (274 or 275 points) in only 13% of the cases (compared to 67% in Small), and successfully achieve a 50-50 split in less than 1% of the observed pairs (compared to 46% in Small). 24 If power is almost balanced players may either perceive the setup of cost parameters with c A = 4 and c B = 5 as basically symmetric, or they may choose the 50-50 split as a coordination device. We will pick up on this question in Section 5.4. In the case of a large asymmetry, the 50-50 split loses its property as a focal point and coordination becomes seemingly more di¢ cult.
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Figure 4 depict the distributions of bargaining outcomes with Small and Large asymmetry. The dark (green) combinations show demands that sum up to less than the prize V and lead to peaceful divisions, the light (orange) combinations show demand combinations that sum up to more than V and that lead to con ‡ict. First, consider the players' actual payo¤ if they can reach a peaceful division in stage 1. In Small, conditional on bargaining being successful, A receives 268:9 points and B receives 267:9 points and, hence, almost the same payo¤ (see also Figure A .2a in the appendix).
With an imbalance of power in Large, successful peaceful agreements in Demand allocate 311:9 points to the advantaged player and 178:4 points to the disadvantaged player (see again Figure A .2a in the appendix). 26 The advantaged player A ends up with an average share upon peaceful division that is even slightly lower than his empirically observed average con ‡ict payo¤ (which is 318:5; see Figure A .2b in the appendix). The disadvantaged player B, however, earns signi…cantly more when a peaceful agreement is reached than what he would get in con ‡ict (his observed con ‡ict payo¤ is only 2:7 and, hence, even much less than predicted by theory). Thus, in the Nash demand game with large asymmetry, on average, 24 Already in the successful 50-50 splits with Small asymmetry we observe that the advantaged player A demands slightly more than the disadvantaged player B even if this can come at a high cost in case bargaining fails. With Small asymmetry, about 27% of the successful 50-50 splits allocate 275 points to A and 274 points to B, while the reverse with B earning 275 points and A earming 274 points only occurs in 7:6% of cases. (In the remaining 65:5% of successful 50-50 splits A and B each earn 274, forgoing one point of the prize.) 25 Also compare Anbarci and Feltovich (2014) who observe that outcomes crucially depend on whether the 50-50 split is a viable split. 26 These shares in successful agreements are considerably below the players' average demands in Large (Figure 3b ). Further indication that settlement is more di¢ cult with a large imbalance of power stems from the di¤erence in the sum of realized peaceful shares: With small asymmetry, sucessful peaceful agreements allocate 98% of the prize, while, with large asymmetry, this number is reduced to 89%. Hence, more rent is left on the table when the imbalance of power becomes stronger. successful bargaining allocates the entire material surplus of peaceful sharing to the disadvantaged player B, while the advantaged player A only gets his outside option (a resource share close to his con ‡ict payo¤).
Result 6 (a) When asymmetry in …ghting strengths is small, the distribution of demand choices by players A and B is concentrated at (and just below) 50% of the prize. Players successfully achieve a 50-50 split in about half of the cases.
(b) When asymmetry in …ghting strengths is large, coordination on the 50-50 split is no longer predominant. (c) If bargaining is successful, the division of the peace dividend (bargaining surplus) is biased in favor of the disadvantaged player.
Discussion
The results that the con ‡ict probability in the Demand treatments is (weakly) lower than in Split if the asymmetry is small but signi…cantly higher than in Split if the asymmetry is large raises two main questions: First, do individuals consider the proposed Nash bargaining solution as "unfair" if power is almost balanced? Would they rather prefer an equal split (which they can implement in Demand)? And second, is the high con ‡ict probability in the Nash demand game with large asymmetry mainly due to coordination failure? That is, does large asymmetry simply make it more di¢ cult to coordinate on one of the equilibria? To answer these questions and investigate further the observed relation of the balance of power and the likelihood of con ‡ict, we conduct two sets of control treatments.
SPLIT-50-50 treatment
First we conduct a variant of the Split-Small treatment in which the exogenously proposed split is not the Nash bargaining solution but an equal division of the prize V = 549.
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To be precise, the proposed split is (275; 274) and in each matched pair of players it is randomly decided who gets the additional point. 28 If the bargaining solution in Split with small asymmetry is perceived as unfair by the players, the con ‡ict probability in this control treatment Split-50-50 should be lower than in Split-Small and also lower than in Demand-Small (where coordination failure may still occur).
The results on con ‡ict probabilities and rejection probabilities are summarized in Figure 5 . We …nd that the likelihood of con ‡ict in Split-50-50 is even slightly higher than in Split-Small (36:8% compared to 33:6%; the di¤erence is statistically insigni…cant). Consequently, there is signi…cantly more con ‡ict in Split-50-50 than in Demand-Small (p-value 0:069). Thus, an equal split is not the "fair" division that every individual prefers. Quite the contrary, the rejection probability of the stronger player (player A with the e¤ort cost c A = 4) signi…cantly increases to 35:1%. In turn, the rejection probability of the weaker player (player B with the e¤ort cost c B = 5) who is favored by the equal division signi…-cantly decreases to 8:3%. Both for players A and B, the di¤erence of the rejection probability in Split-50-50 compared to Split-Small is highly signi…cant (p-value<0:001); compare Figure 5b . These results can again be explained by relative standing comparisons, causing a larger share of players A to prefer con ‡ict where their expected payo¤ is higher than B's expected payo¤. Note also that player i's rejection probability in Split-50-50 is higher in case of an allocation (s i ; s i ) = (274; 275) than in case of (s i ; s i ) = (275; 274) (see Figure  A. 3 in Appendix A.5); subjects do not like to be worse o¤ even by a single point. 29 Overall, a change in the proposed division to an equal split does not reduce the con ‡ict probability. 27 Apart from the change in the proposed division, the setup is exactly as in Split-Small outlined in Section 3.2. We have nine independent observations from 72 subjects who took part in this treatment. 28 This allocation rule makes the Split-50-50 treatment most comparable to the Split-Small treatment, keeping the exact same total value of the prize as well as complete information about the proposed split. In addition, the proposed allocations are also part of the choice set in the Demand treatments. 29 This …nding is also in line with the observation that a substantial amount of subjects in Demand-Small choose a share s i = 275, even though this more than doubles the likelihood of con ‡ict compared to a choice of s i = 274. Note: Calculated are mean and standard error (in parentheses) of the probability that a game proceeds to the contest stage (panel a) and the probability that a player rejects the exogenous division (panel b) for the SPLIT-50-50 treatment (compared to SPLIT). Values are based on matching group averages (8 subjects over 30 rounds per matching group). Di¤erences between SPLIT and SPLIT-50-50 are tested using Mann Whitney U tests and di¤erences between players A and B are tested using Wilcoxon signed rank tests; tests on the matching-group level (18 observations per test), *** (**) signi…cant at the 1% (5%) level.
Rather, endogenous demand choices seem to adjust better to potential heterogeneity across individuals if power is almost balanced.
To illustrate this latter point, suppose there are two types of individuals across players A and B: on the one hand, individuals who …nd the Nash bargaining solution appropriate (but would also accept a higher share if o¤ered) and, on the other hand, individuals who …nd the equal split appropriate (but would also accept a higher share if o¤ered). Then, in Split-50-50 the probability of con ‡ict is equal to the probability that A is a 'Nash-bargaining-type.' In Split-Small, the probability of con ‡ict is equal to the probability that B is an 'equalsplit-type.' 30 In Demand-Small, however, if players demand their share which they …nd appropriate, the probability of con ‡ict is strictly lower: Con ‡ict occurs only if A is a 'Nashbargaining-type'and at the same time B is an 'equal-split-type.'
DEMAND treatments with focal point
Second, to investigate the reasons for the increase in the con ‡ict probability in the Nash demand game with large asymmetry we conduct a variant of the Demand treatment in which a possible division of the prize is suggested to the players in stage 1 when choosing the Figure 6 : Con ‡ict probability in the Demand-Focal treatments with small and large asymmetry.
Note: Calculated are mean and standard error (in parentheses) of the probability that a game proceeds to the contest stage for the DEMAND-FOCAL treatments (compared to DEMAND without focal point). Values based on matching group averages (8 subjects over 30 rounds per matching group). Di¤erences between DEMAND and DEMAND-FOCAL and between SMALL and LARGE are tested using Mann Whitney U tests; tests on the matching-group level (18 observations per test), *** signi…cant at the 1% level.
share of the prize they want to receive. This suggested division is fully non-binding but may serve as a focal point and solve the problem of multiple equilibria. The suggested division corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution; thus, the resulting Demand-Focal treatments can be considered intermediate treatments between the original Split and Demand. 31 If con ‡ict is mainly driven by coordination failure, the likelihood of con ‡ict should be lower in the Demand-Focal treatments than in the Demand treatments without focal point, especially in the case of large asymmetry. We …nd that even when coordination is facilitated as in Demand-Focal, con ‡ict becomes more likely if power asymmetry is increased (compare rows Small and Large in Figure 6 ). When suggesting a division, the con ‡ict probability slightly increases in case of small asymmetry (from 26:9% to 32:0%) and slightly decreases in case of large asymmetry (from 53:2% to 51:2%); in both cases, however, the di¤erence is statistically insigni…cant. Similarly, the e¤ect on individual demands is only weak, even though average individual demands are slightly closer to the focal point (see Figure A. 4 in Appendix A.6). 32 As in the Demand treatment without focal point (Result 5), individual demand is increasing in a player's relative …ghting strength, with the di¤erences being signi…cant at the 1% level.
Summary:
The results of the control treatments suggest that the increased con ‡ict probability in case of an imbalance of power and endogenous demands can only partially be explained by coordination failure and the fact that an equal split as coordination device is less appealing. Rather, the increased con ‡ict probability in Demand-Large may be linked to the individual heterogeneity observed. If players di¤er in some relevant characteristics, such as their subjective value of winning the contest or their perception of win probabilities in the con ‡ict, this turns the Nash demand game into a game under incomplete information. 33 In line with the much higher variance of individual choices under large asymmetry, the individual perceptions of winning the con ‡ict may be more dispersed if the asymmetry between players is increased. 34 A higher variance of the distribution of types is generally considered as leading to a higher likelihood of con ‡ict when bargaining in the shadow of con ‡ict (Reed 2003; Wittman 2009 ). 35 
Conclusion
We have studied whether a balance of power or an imbalance of power leads to a higher likelihood of con ‡ict. As Wittman (1979) hypothesized, the distribution of power should not matter for the emergence of con ‡ict if players can bargain about the peace dividend, taking into account their respective con ‡ict strengths. Our experimental results provide a richer picture. The results support Wittman's hypothesis for the case of a simple bargaining mechanism that makes it easy for players to coordinate. If, however, the bargaining mechanism involves strategic uncertainty and coordination problems, then the balance of power matters: Higher asymmetries in …ghting strengths make the problem of strategic uncertainty more severe. Consequently, higher asymmetry leads to a higher probability of bargaining failure and con ‡ict. In our baseline treatments, players decide whether or not to accept an exogenous division of the prize (implemented by the laboratory as a shortcut for the Nash bargaining solution). Disadvantaged players are more likely to reject the resulting division, leading to a positive when the focal point is introduced; this e¤ect is strongest in case of small asymmetry. 33 Note that incomplete information is much less of a problem in the Split treatments where individuals have a strictly dominant strategy at stage 1 (their acceptance decision is independent of the co-player's choice). 34 The histograms of individual demands in the Demand treatments in Appendix A.4 illustrate the higher variance of choices under large asymmetry compared to small asymmetry. 35 Also compare Morrow (1989) on the role of misperceptions and incomplete informtion for the probability of war.
overall con ‡ict probability. But a higher asymmetry between players does not signi…cantly a¤ect this overall con ‡ict probability. If, instead, bargaining follows the rule of the Nash demand game, players have to balance their peaceful demands. In case of a small asymmetry between players, there is a tendency to split the prize evenly; successful 50-50 splits occur in about half of the cases. Even if stronger players do not consider it appropriate, an equal split may serve as a focal point and facilitate coordination in case power is almost balanced.
With larger asymmetry, however, the strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game becomes more important, as players do no longer consider the 50-50 split as an option to solve the coordination problem. Although bargaining choices adjust to the relative …ghting strengths, bargaining fails to reach a peaceful agreement in more than half of the cases, even when the Nash bargaining solution is suggested to the players as a possible allocation. If players …nd an agreement, some ine¢ ciency emerges in that players are not successful in dividing the full prize between them but leave a share of the peace dividend on the negotiation table.
In line with subgame perfection, the higher a player's relative …ghting strength, the more this player demands for himself in the bargaining stage. This is true even though the asymmetry of players stems from di¤erent marginal costs that only become relevant when players enter the contest in stage 2. Empirically, bargaining power is biased towards the player who is disadvantaged in the contest; with large asymmetry in …ghting strength, successful bargaining outcomes allocate basically the entire peace dividend to the player with the higher …ghting cost.
What does our experimental study tell us on how to avoid con ‡ict between individuals? Our results underline the importance of bargaining rules: the institutional structure of bargaining. These institutional rules matter, even in a context of perfect information. Coordination or a possible failure to coordinate constitute a major e¢ ciency problem. We expect this …nding to be relevant in situations of distributional con ‡ict that may turn into a …ght or, more generally, into a scenario in which players choose resource-wasteful investments to in ‡uence an allocation decision. Such e¢ ciency problems may be even more severe in a context of incomplete information. Then, bargaining behavior may have informational value because it serves as a signal of players' strengths. This implies additional strategic considerations and reputation concerns which may make players less willing to compromise. If the institutional bargaining environment involves strategic uncertainty, it may be di¢ cult to agree even in a context of perfect information.
Our results also speak in favor of a mediator as an e¤ective way to prevent resourcewasteful con ‡ict in the presence of coordination problems. The treatments with the exogenous division mechanism e¤ectively propose an "equitable" settlement. Such binding third-party suggestions for settlement make the outbreak of a contest seemingly much less dependent of whether parties to the con ‡ict are rather symmetric or asymmetric. This outcome depends, of course, on whether the con ‡icting parties perceive the proposed division as being in line with their relative …ghting strengths. Information about the perceived …ghting strengths as well as feasibility of the corresponding peaceful division becomes crucial for successful mediation. As our results show, if power is almost balanced, the bargaining game with endogenously chosen demands even leads to more e¢ cient outcomes than the exogenous mediation proposal because endogenous divisions can be better adjusted to individual heterogeneity in unobservable characteristics.
A Appendix
A.1 Theory prediction 
A.2 Regression analysis
A panel regression analysis con…rms the …ndings of the non-parametric tests on the summary statistics. Table A. 2 presents results of three sets of random-e¤ects regressions: logistic regressions of the individual choice whether to reject the exogenous division in Split and in Split-50-50, respectively; Tobit regressions of the individual demand chosen in Demand and in Demand-Focal, respectively; and a Tobit regression of the individual e¤ort choice in the stage 2 contest. 36 All regressions include an individual's e¤ort cost parameter as the main independent variable, assuming for illustrative purposes a linear e¤ect of the stage 2 e¤ort cost. Moreover, we include socioeconomic information from the post-experimental questionnaire and a number of individual-speci…c control variables generated in post-experimental tests. The latter include measures of risk preferences and distributional preferences as well as a measure for ambiguity aversion (compare Section 3.2).
In line with the non-parametric tests, we …nd that higher e¤ort cost leads to a signi…cantly higher probability to reject the Nash bargaining solution in Split but to a signi…cantly lower probability to reject the equal split in Split-50-50 (compare the …rst two estimations in Table A. 2). Moreover, demand choices in the Nash demand game are signi…cantly lower the higher the stage 2 e¤ort cost; this e¤ect is stronger in the Demand-Focal treatments where demands are closer to the Nash bargaining solution and hence more reactive to changes in the e¤ort cost (see estimations 3 and 4 in Table A.2) . 37 Finally, e¤ort is signi…cantly lower the higher a player's e¤ort cost (see estimation 5 in Table A .2). The explanatory power of the individual-speci…c characteristics is mixed. For example, a higher willingness to take risks is positively correlated with the reject probability and the e¤ort choice. Note: Estimation (1) is a random-e¤ects logistic regression of the rejection probability in SPLIT (144 individuals); Estimation (2) is a random-e¤ects logistic regression of the rejection probability in SPLIT-50-50 (72 individuals); the dependent variable is equal to one if a subject chose rejection and 0 otherwise. Estimation (3) is a random e¤ects Tobit regression of the share in DEMAND (144 individuals); Estimation (4) is a random e¤ects Tobit regression of the share in DEMAND-FOCAL (144 individuals); the dependent variable is the percentage points demanded (truncated at 0 and 100). Estimation (5) is a random e¤ects Tobit regression of stage 2 e¤ort (truncated at 0; 503 individuals). Standard errors in parentheses. ***(**,*) signi…cant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. "Socioeconomics" controls for age, gender, …eld of study, semester and number of siblings. "risk_general" is a self-reported measure for the willingness to take risk on an increasing scale from 0-10; "risk_lottery" measures the number of investments in lotteries with di¤erent win probabilities (on a scale from 0-5). "prosocial", "prosocialcostly", "envy", and "envycostly"are dummy variables indicating individual decisions in two-person allocation choices. "ambiguity_aversion"is a dummy variable derived from the choice between lotteries with known vs. unknown win probabilities. A.3 Payo¤s conditional on whether bargaining was successful Note: Calculated are mean and standard error (in parentheses) of the probability that a player rejects the exogenous division in SPLIT-50-50, depending on whether the player is allocated 274 or 275 points in the exogenous division. Values based on matching group averages (8 subjects over 30 rounds per matching group). Di¤erences are tested using Wilcoxon signed rank tests on the matching-group level (18 observations per test), ***(**) signi…cant at the 1% (5%) level.
A.6 Demands in DEMAND and DEMAND-FOCAL (stage 1) Your earnings in this experiment will be measured in Talers. At the end of the experiment we will convert the Talers you have earned to cash and pay you in private. For each 50 Talers you earn you will be paid 1 Euro in cash. In addition, each participant will receive a show-up-fee of 4 Euros.
Please keep in mind that you are not allowed to communicate with other participants during the entire experiment. If you do not obey this rule, you will be asked to leave the laboratory and will not be paid. Whenever you have a question, please raise your hand and we will help you.
Your task In the main part of today's experiment, two participants each will make a decision on how to split 549 Talers If one of the two participants decides in favor of the proposed split and the other decides against it, then there will be a random draw: In 9 out of 10 cases, the division of the 549
Talers is decided in "stage 2,"and in 1 out of 10 cases, the 549 Talers will be split as proposed. If one of the two participants did not buy any Tokens, the other participant receives the 549
Talers. If none of the players bought any token, then each participant's success probability is 50%.
Note that the more tokens a player buys, the more likely it is for him to get the 549 Talers in stage 2, but the more Talers have to be paid as cost of the tokens. On the computer screen it will be possible to compute the Talers to be paid for arbitrary choices of tokens. Moreover, you can compute success probabilities for any number of tokens potentially chosen by you and your co-player.
In the experiment the success probabilities are illustrated by a circular area on the screen. The area is divided into two colors: the red segment represents the success probability of A and the blue segment represents the success probability of A. An arrow on the circular area will …rst rotate and then stop randomly. Depending on where the arrow stops (in the red or the blue segment), A or B will get the 549 Talers. Procedure The main part of the experiment will consist of 30 identical and independent rounds.
In each of these rounds, 549 Talers will be divided between two participants each, according to the rules described above.
In each round, the co-player will be randomly and newly assigned to you; hence, your co-player will typically vary across rounds. You will not know the identity of your respective co-player. Any attempt to reveal your identity is prohibited.
Furthermore, it will be randomly decided in each round whether you are participant A or participant B in this round. Hence, in each round, it will be randomly decided who (you or your co-player) is assigned the low (and the high, respectively) cost per token.
At the end of today's experiment, your Talers earned in 3 out of the 30 rounds will be added up and the cost for tokens possibly bought in these rounds will be deducted. The resulting amount will be converted to Euros (50 Talers = 1 Euro). The earnings of the other rounds will not be paid to you. For these other rounds, however, you do not have to pay the cost of tokens bought either.
Which 3 out of the 30 rounds are relevant for your payo¤ will be determined only at the end of this experiment.
In addition, you receive 10 Euros that will be added to your earnings (gain or loss) in the 3 randomly selected rounds. On top of that you will receive the show-up-fee of 4 Euros. The resulting amount will be paid to you in cash.
Before the experiment starts, you will be asked some questions about the experiment on the screen. These questions should illustrate the rules of the experiment by means of di¤erent examples.
After the experiment, you will be asked for some additional information. All the information you provide will be kept anonymous and strictly con…dential.
We would like to thank you in advance for participating and wish you good luck! B.3
